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Economic Development
and Industrial Relations
in a Small-Firm Economy
The Experience of Metalworkers 
in Emilia-Romagna, Italy
Bruce Herman 
Garment Industry Development Corporation
One example often referred to in discussions of successful eco 
nomic restructuring is the "Third Italy," particularly the Emilia- 
Romagna region of north-central Italy. And yet in the growing litera 
ture on Emilia-Romagna there is often little mention of the role of 
industrial relations in this predominantly small-firm economy. This 
chapter seeks to explain the history and results of a proactive collective 
bargaining strategy developed by the Federazione Impiegati Operai 
Metallurgici (FIOM), the metal-mechanical union affiliated with the 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), in the context of 
the successful industrial restructuring of the Emilian economy.
The FIOM, with almost 70,000 members in the region (Catholic and 
Republican affiliates have 16,000 members), in an industry sector with 
a 55 percent unionization rate, has used its strength to pursue a proac 
tive collective bargaining strategy designed to increase worker partici 
pation and control. 1 Leveraging needed organizational change within 
the firm to gain greater autonomy and an expanded role in the restruc 
turing process, the FIOM is trying to "regain" control of work layout 
and job design. The goal of the FIOM approach is to establish an ongo 
ing, autonomous union role in what are often referred to as areas of 
management prerogative (such as work layout and staffing) inside indi 
vidual firms (intrafirm). Yet, given the complex web of relations 
between firms (interfirm) in Emilia-Romagna, the FIOM strategy is
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also clearly intended to promote an active union role in defining inter- 
firm relations as well.
The initial objective of the HOM strategy is to expand the scope of 
collective bargaining to establish interdisciplinary (cutting horizontally 
across existing vertical hierarchies), autonomous work groups, thereby 
bilaterally determining job design and layout Once established, these 
work groups will pursue productivity improvements and be rewarded 
based upon the results achieved. However, because of the autonomy of 
the work groups, management does not automatically gain access to 
the methods whereby the productivity improvements were achieved. 
Therefore, by attempting to establish ongoing autonomy and control 
over production decisions, the FIOM of Emilia-Romagna is redefining 
the boundaries of collective bargaining and industrial relations.
Background
Industrial relations have been in a state of flux for the past few 
decades, with the Italian situation exhibiting considerable volatility.2 
Twenty-five years ago the Italian labor movement found itself with for 
mal recognition guaranteed by the Italian constitution, but with very 
little real power and almost no presence inside the factory. 3 The union 
federations—Communist/Socialist (CGIL), Catholic (CISL), Republi 
can (UIL)—were numerically significant, yet they lacked effective 
power both on the shop floor and at the national policymaking level. 
This situation of formal recognition but de facto exclusion was swept 
away by the social unrest of the late 1960s and the "Italian Hot 
Autumn" of 1969. Throughout this phase of rapid ascendancy on the 
part of labor and the working class, the union movement played a var 
ied role, from that of catalyst to reactive captive, attempting to "ride 
the tiger."4 Nonetheless, despite a somewhat contradictory approach, 
by the mid-1970s the Italian labor movement was considerably 
strengthened and therefore had much to lose in the subsequent period 
of resurgent capital.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Italian labor movement 
succeeded in establishing, or co-opting, factory-based workers coun 
cils (consigli di fabbrica) while simultaneously achieving a national
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role in setting macroeconomic policy. Utilizing a process of political 
exchange, the Italian union federations were able to insert themselves 
into a tripartite, neo-corporatist bargaining process involving govern 
ment and industry. 5 Once having gained a seat at the national policy- 
making table, the union federations used their ability to control the 
political activities of their members (e.g., strikes, job actions, and 
broader demonstrations) in exchange for favored macroeconomic and 
social policy. The passage of the Italian Labor Bill of Rights (Statute di 
Lavoro) in 1970, the legislative response to the unrest of 1968-69, 
proved to be the most enduring result of this period of tripartite bar 
gaining.
Relations between the three national trade union federations— 
CGIL, CISL, and UIL—also improved dramatically during the 1970s. 
Increased cooperation among them led to the adoption in February 
1978 of a common platform, the EUR Accord, and it appeared as 
though a new era of industrial relations was beginning.6 The post-EUR 
optimism proved to be short-lived.
Union solidarity ruptured when CISL, UIL, and part of the CGIL 
supported the Craxi government plan to limit the wage indexing sys 
tem (seala mobile) in 1984. The metalworkers union, the Federazione 
Lavoratori Metalmeccanici (FLM), officially broke apart in February 
1984, although the crisis had been in the making since 1979-80. In par 
ticular, the failed 35-day strike at HAT in 1980 was emblematic, mark 
ing a significant shift in power away from unions and toward 
management initiative.7 After the 35-day strike, FIAT management 
moved quickly to reassert complete control over the organization of 
the factory by using technology to unilaterally restructure the firm. 8
Throughout Italy firms followed FIATs lead as industry restruc 
tured to the detriment of organized labor. Management began to out- 
source components, followed by whole subassemblies, in order to 
circumvent large unionized firms.9 Growing decentralization, fueled by 
outsourcing, contributed substantially to the proliferation of small 
firms; and as some of these firms increased their sophistication and 
capacity to meet market demand, local industrial agglomerations began 
to coalesce. 10 The development of a broad range of business services, 
including market, financial, and production assistance, by trade associ 
ations and some local governments assisted small firms in achieving 
certain "external" economies of scale. Shaped by the decentralization
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process and the subsequent interventions on behalf of trade associa 
tions and government, Emilia-Romagna evolved into one of the most 
advanced examples of a small-firm economy. Today, while some large, 
vertically integrated firms continue to operate in the region (FIATs 
tractor factory in Modena is one example), the Emilian reality is pre 
dominantly one of small and medium-sized firms.
Located in the heart of what has come to be known as the Third Italy 
(an area stretching from the Veneto to Tuscany), the Emilia-Romagna 
region of north-central Italy provides a useful example of dynamic 
economic development." This region has undergone a dramatic trans 
formation in the past 50 years, moving from fascist domination and 
civil war to a situation of broad economic well-being and political 
domination by the Italian Communist Party (PCI). 12 The present, 
unquestionably fluid situation in which the PCI is attempting to 
"refound" itself does not negate over 40 years of the PCI's rule.
The PCI's historic Bologna Congress of March 1990 confirmed the 
initiative to reconstitute the party, and at the Rimini Congress in early 
1991, the PCI officially became the Partite Democratic© della Sinistra 
(Democratic Party of the Left—PdS). Different interpretations of the 
new course remain and the divisions could well be destabilizing for the 
PdS. PdS Secretary, Achille Ochetto, the architect of the transforma 
tion, was himself rebuffed at the Rimini Congress by not being 
reelected Secretary on the first ballot, although he was reelected on the 
second ballot. Still, Ochetto, his cadre of quarantenne (40-year-olds, a 
reference to youth and an acknowledgment that the post-World War II 
generation has taken the lead within the party apparatus), and the nor 
mally allied reformist "miglioristi" wing of the party appear to have 
mustered a somewhat unstable majority.
Long-term PCI control over local governments has made Emilia- 
Romagna a center of activity for both the miglioristi and the postwar 
militants. Often in conflict in the past, many members of these two 
groups found themselves united in the "si" (promajoritarian/Ochetto 
platform) coalition during the heated internal debate that led to the 
demise of the PCI and the simultaneous birth of the PdS. 13 Perhaps 
more important, the transformation of the PCI into the PdS is, accord 
ing to the majoritarian position, an attempt to broaden the party to 
include other progressive forces. In this respect, Emilia-Romagna has
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been a leading example of inclusive politics based on the dominant 
electoral position of the PCI.
Coalition politics and government are familiar situations in Emilia- 
Romagna where the PCI has usually preferred to govern with the Ital 
ian Socialist Party (PSI). Recent, exclusively PCI, "monocolore" gov 
ernments appeared to challenge the norm of coalition, but the 
municipal elections of May 1990, in which the PCI continued to lose 
votes, led to a return of coalition government.
Since July 1990, Bologna (the capital of Emilia-Romagna) has been 
governed by a PCI, PSI and Psdi (Italian Social-Democratic Party) 
coalition headed by Renato Imbeni of the PdS, member of the Euro 
pean Parliament and mayor since 1983. At the regional level, the 
numerical impossibility of a local equivalent to the ruling national coa 
lition (the pentapartito or five-party coalition comprised of the Chris 
tian Democrats, PSI, Psdi, Republicans and Liberals) led to a regional 
agreement between the PCI, PSI, Psdi and the Republican Party. These 
recent political changes have resulted in the election of Socialist 
Enrico Boselli as President of the region. 14
In terms of industrial policy, the Regional Ministry of Industry, tra 
ditionally the domain of the PCI, is now in the hands of the Republican 
Party. The Republican Party is not a formal member of the governing 
coalition, but the Republicans agreed to support the new government 
and were given the Regional Ministry of Industry as part of that agree 
ment. Whether or not these political changes will lead to any signifi 
cant shifts in industrial policy remains to be seen.
The Emilian Economy
At the end of World War II, the local economy of Emilia-Romagna 
was primarily agricultural, with the manufacturing that did exist being 
concentrated in a small number of large, vertically integrated firms. 15 
This situation changed drastically during the 1950s and 1960s as agri 
culture was replaced by manufacturing as the dominant economic 
activity in the region.
It was also during the immediate post-World War II period that an 
active cooperative sector began to reassert itself. 16 Originally, the co-op
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movement was based in the agricultural sector, but it quickly spread to 
construction, food processing and distribution, light manufacturing, 
and transportation. Today, many Emilian co-ops have become large 
enterprises, dominating some industry sectors (construction, food pro 
cessing and distribution) and active in all economic areas. 17
As industry grew, there was a concomitant deterioration of the dom 
inance of a few sizable manufacturing firms and a proliferation of flex 
ible, specialized small firms. Today, Emilia-Romagna, with a 
population of almost 4 million, has over 325,000 individual firms. 
More than 90 percent employ fewer than 50 people, and almost 40 per 
cent of the workforce is engaged in manufacturing. The results of this 
decentralized, yet integrated, system of firms are striking.
•Wage rates are almost double the Italian average.
•Productivity is among Europe's highest
•Exports are increasing (7.9 percent of Italian exports originated in 
Emilia-Romagna in 1973; 10.2 percent in 1986).
•Per capita income grew faster than the Italian average between 
1970 and 1979; by 1979 per capita income in the region was 127 
percent of the national average. During the same 1970-79 period, 
the provinces of Modena and Reggio moved from seventeenth and 
twelfth in national income rankings to second and fourth, respec 
tively (Brusco 1982).
•From 1971 to the present, Gross Regional Product has increased 
over 50 percent. 18
Overall, the economy of Emilia-Romagna has proved to be both 
resilient, specializing in high value-added products, and adaptable, 
adjusting quickly to market fluctuations. A system of auxiliary industry 
services that operate through pooled resources, accessible programs, 
and accountable member organizations has directly contributed to the 
high level of technical expertise attained by individual firms.
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Decentralized Production and Flexible Manufacturing
Initially, the small firms of Emilia-Romagna served large enterprises 
as dependent subcontractors, and some of those relationships continue 
today. For example, many of the Modena artisans continue to supply 
components, or specialized manufacturing services such as grinding 
and heat treating, to FIAT's tractor factory, one of the remaining large, 
vertically integrated firms in Emilia-Romagna. Still, to overcome the 
negative consequences of being dependent subcontractors, many small 
shops learned to diversify their client base through horizontal linkages 
to other small firms. This process was accelerated as small firms 
decided to pursue discrete specializations in order to differentiate their 
activities and expertise from that of other small firms.
Relationships of trust grew as firms subcontracted among them 
selves rather than refusing to take on contracts too large for the indi 
vidual shop. Informal networks developed, especially in the tightly 
knit industrial districts in and around Bologna, Modena, and north 
along the via Emilia (Carpi, Reggio-Emilia, Piacenza) to Milan. 19
Commercial linkages were also encouraged by the diversification, 
fragmentation, and customization of market demand, which led firms 
to adapt flexible production techniques, both internally and externally, 
through outsourcing. Specialization strengthened commercial linkages, 
and as the small firms became increasingly independent of large enter 
prises, they began to coordinate their respective expertise, thereby 
developing value-adding partnerships. 20
Cooperation between firms made it feasible to bid on larger, more 
valuable contracts, and this in turn stimulated the growth of value-add 
ing chains which could be coordinated to create complete products. 
Stronger commercial relationships reinforced the tendency of industry 
sectors to cluster, further stimulating the consolidation of industrial 
districts comprised of firms involved in different stages of produc 
tion.21 These developments were facilitated by the growth of industry 
services which helped overcome the traditional limits of small busi 
ness.
Informal relations between firms have become.more structured as 
some medium-sized local firms have begun to acquire outright, or take 
a minority equity position in smaller, generally more specialized satel-
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lite firms. For example, Corazza, a medium-sized company producing 
food packaging equipment located outside Bologna, recently bought 
one of its more sophisticated subcontractors and acquired equity posi 
tions in other small suppliers. Similar relations are being established 
throughout the Emilian economy.
Many of the larger co-ops have grown by merging with other co 
ops.22 Recent studies have also identified significant merger and acqui 
sition activity as many of the Emilian firms are increasingly integrated 
into the global economy through large multinational corporations.23
Industry Services
In Emilia-Romagna, industry services are used not only to support 
individual firms, but to stimulate shared solutions to what appear at 
first to be individual problems.24 At the outset, industry services were 
provided by trade associations to take advantage of appropriate econo 
mies of scale and cut overhead costs for member firms. Because 
resources could be pooled by trade associations, shared accounting, 
payroll, and business planning services were available for reduced user 
fees. Easy access to these services (available to nonmember firms as 
well, though at a higher price) allows firms to cut costs while concen 
trating on producing high quality products.
The National Confederation of Artisans (CNA) is the most notable 
example of a small-firm trade association aggressively involved in pro 
viding an array of business services.25 Formed in the immediate post- 
World War II period, the CNA has grown to include 340,000 member 
firms (80,000 in Emilia-Romagna). Nationally, the organization has 
2,300 offices and 7,000 employees and is financed through annual 
membership dues of $100, plus 1 percent of payroll. As with most Ital 
ian trade associations, the CNA is organized both geographically and 
by industry sector. Local CNA chapters are organized at the provincial 
level and governed by an elected board of directors who must them 
selves be artisans. Sector-specific trade federations are organized 
nationally in 27 categories (i.e., metalworking, woodworking, cloth 
ing). Thus, artisan firms normally belong to a sector-specific trade fed 
eration within provincial chapters of the CNA.
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The sector-specific focus allows the CNA and its federations to 
develop considerable expertise and sophisticated, tailored business ser 
vices. Sector-specific expertise, channeled into geographically proxi 
mal clusters of related firms, allows the CNA staff to maximize its 
outreach for minimal cost. The democratic and participatory nature of 
the CNA also facilitates an ongoing process of interaction and 
exchange of information among member firms. As the CNA began to 
develop more sophisticated types of business services, member firms 
grew to expect and therefore demand increased levels of service.
Following the lead of trade associations, the regional and local gov 
ernments became actively involved in enterprise creation and develop 
ment. Promoting a system of industry services that facilitates economic 
development, public planners opted for an "incubator without walls" 
strategy. Economic development activities focused on:
•assistance in business expansion and new enterprise creation by 
developing targeted industrial parks for small firms and supporting 
trade associations and cooperatives to foster new enterprises;
•sectoral technology transfer programs and research services to aid 
innovation;
•market information, export assistance and support for trade fairs;
•upgrading the entire vocational and technical training system;
•financial assistance for an array of needs including training, group 
procurement, and purchasing new equipment.
To implement this strategy, a public-private partnership, ERVET, 
was created by the regional government with the support of local banks 
and trade associations in 1974. ERVET's industrial policy is geared 
towards sectors rather than individual firms and designed to provide 
both vertical (sector-specific) and horizontal (across industries) assis 
tance through technology transfer and marketing service centers 
located in their respective industrial districts. Established centers 
include:
Vertical (sector-specific) CITER (1980) for knitwear and fashion
CESMA (1983) for agricultural 
machinery 
CERCAL (1983) for shoe firms
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QUASCO (1985) for the construction 
industry
Horizontal (cutting across sector) CERMET (1985) for the metal
mechanical and related industries 
ASTER (1985) technology transfer and 
R&D center
RESFOR (1986) promotes 
subcontracting arrangements among 
firms located in the region 
SVEX (1989) export assistance for small 
firms
Labor's Role
The success of the broad, highly articulated economic development 
infrastructure of Emilia-Romagna is generally acknowledged. Less 
discussed is the role of industrial relations and organized labor in the 
Emilian economy.26 To date, trade unions play no direct role in the 
established service centers, and unlike local banks, trade associations 
and educational institutions, labor unions do not sit on the advisory 
boards of ERVET or the established centers.
The fact that organized labor plays little direct role in the service 
centers is criticized by the unions, although the criticism is somewhat 
muted given the leading role of the PCI-PdS and its historic alliance 
with the trade union movement (especially the CGIL). Still, organized 
labor's demand to be part of the governing board for a long-anticipated 
regional research complex, Polo Tecnologica, was the principal imped 
iment that delayed the start of the project for almost three years. 
Recently, the controversy was settled in labor's favor and the unions 
will be represented on the governing board of Polo Tecnologica. 27 This 
in itself is an interesting prospect, since few unions share a similar role 
in the world's increasingly numerous science parks.
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FIOM's Strategy
While the FIOM supports efforts to gain access to the region's eco 
nomic development apparatus, it has concentrated on using the collec 
tive bargaining process to broaden participation and gain more 
autonomy on the shop floor and increased control over the process of 
production. As explained by the FIOM's Regional General Secretary, 
Francesco Garibaldo:
Since the end of the sixties a specific characteristic of the 
Bolognese metal-mechanical workers' experience is the enduring 
interest in the organization of work considered as the meeting 
point of every strategic problem: wage, work environment, pace 
and intensity of production and career development.28
Focusing on work organization assisted the FIOM in successfully 
contesting management's efforts during the 1970s to improve produc 
tivity by simply speeding up production rather than exploring a more 
efficient organization of production.
The success of FIOM's bargaining position influenced manage 
ment's decision to initiate a new investment cycle through the intro 
duction of computer-numerically-controlled equipment. During this 
phase of technological change and reorganization, the FIOM pursued a 
policy designed 'to contest the capitalistic work organization and to 
build up the power of the workers over their work conditions." Overall, 
the strategy was quite successful and workers gained significant power 
within the firm; piecework was done away with, "the whole wage was 
a bargained wage" with wage differentials based on skill, and a 35- 
hour workweek was established.
Management attempts to divide craft activities, such as those of 
machine tool workers or design engineers, into many unskilled jobs 
was also resisted. Instead, the FIOM insisted upon an open career for 
each craft-like activity. Career mobility would be encouraged by 
requiring that rotation and recomposition schemes be linked to broad- 
based education courses, rather than more limited task-specific train 
ing. These achievements may seem modest, yet when compared to 
counterparts in the rest of the industrialized world, the FIOM has 
clearly succeeded where many others have failed.
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The FIOM's organizational presence and power inside the firm com 
pelled management to bargain and, in exchange for performance, to 
increase wages as well as allow for growing self-management over 
work conditions. However, by 1977 this strategy had reached an 
impasse; the expansion of outsourcing and supply firms, coupled with 
the introduction of new computer-based technologies and new organi 
zational criteria combined to erode the gains derived from the FIOM's 
policies.29
Searching for a new approach, FIOM concentrated on building up 
craft-based professional areas (technicians, design engineers, operators 
and fitters) but strong management pressure for increased flexibility 
limited the FIOM strategy to "a few small experiments."30 Given these 
unsatisfactory results, FIOM continued to search for a viable alterna 
tive.
The Search for an Alternative
The conceptual basis for FIOM's new approach is the belief that the 
world economy is in the midst of a new industrial revolution. In the 
emerging industrial order there is a growing tension between the "inte 
gration needs" inherent in the increasingly complex organizational and 
technical aspects of production and the model of social relations. In the 
"old" social model, employee cooperation was bargained for in a rigid, 
mechanical (Tayloristic) fashion, resulting in complex, hierarchical 
work rules. Within the emerging system of production, employee 
cooperation needs to be of an organic (flexible) nature, involving more 
interactive problemsolving than was previously the case.
To better comprehend the transition from mechanical to flexible 
cooperation, the FIOM initiated two research projects. The first aimed 
at understanding the impact of emerging economic conditions on the 
structure of the firm and work organization, while the second project 
concentrated on identifying and comprehending the subjective feelings 
of the workers about their work experience. 31 The results of these two 
projects were widely discussed as the FIOM debated a new strategy.
From 1985 to 1987, the FIOM began to pull together the methodol 
ogy needed to pursue an "alternative strategy." The starting point was a
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new educational scheme for unionists designed not to rely upon a pre 
fabricated set of solutions, but rather promote an interdisciplinary 
understanding of the new technological and organizational revolution 
currently underway. This new educational program was in turn linked 
to a participatory design process geared toward a radical reform of 
work organization and industrial relations.
Acknowledging that there are diverse strategies to achieve a more 
"organic cooperation," the FIOM decided to pursue a "democratic 
alternative" based on interactive work groups.32 The decision to pro 
mote work organization based on group activities was itself a risky 
one. As pointed out by the FIOM's chief consultant on the project:
Work organized by groups, like work carried out individually, is 
marked by contradiction. On the one hand, such groups can be 
manipulated by the mechanisms of management; on the other, 
they can use the bargaining process to reclaim the ability to man 
age themselves.
Embracing the dynamic of group experience does not mean 
adhering strictly to approaches which favor workers alone. 
Indeed, such an approach can only be subordinate to corporate 
goals. The issue is rather one of distinguishing between the work 
organization "produced" by the group in the framework of a given 
firm, and the group's relationship to worker identity—an equally 
critical process.33
Beginning in 1987, the FIOM began to sign a series of agreements 
aimed at establishing more participatory cooperation through group- 
oriented work organization. Briefly, two broad categories of agree 
ments have been signed. The first, and more limited set of agreements, 
established procedures whereby the unions and factory council dele 
gates would receive advance information on new technologies and/or 
changes in work organization. Once informed, the union and the dele 
gates can propose an alternative plan which management must review 
and discuss. The weakness of this first approach is that there is no obli 
gation to come to a mutually acceptable agreement.
The second approach includes the procedures of the first but goes 
further by establishing bargained patterns of work organization with 
considerable autonomy from management intrusion for some areas of 
the firm. In these agreements there are provisions which establish 
diverse, autonomous work groups. For example, certain agreements
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established "unified production groups." The main characteristics of 
these groups are:
1. The group has autonomy to decide its own task assignments, 
maintenance, and educational courses for skill development.
2. The group has a coordinator (usually a skilled worker) who coor 
dinates the management of the group. The position of coordinator 
rotates from every four to six months depending on the agree 
ment
3. The group workload is bargained for once a year and production 
beyond the agreed upon amount is rewarded. Other types of 
groups have been established in specific functional segments of 
the firm (e.g., design department groups), or for systems integra 
tion/assembly (e.g., the "fitting group," which assembles a com 
plex automatic machine).
The specifics vary from firm to firm and agreement to agreement, but 
the overall approach is consistent; the focus remains the control over 
the organization of production, autonomy from what is viewed as rigid, 
hierarchical management control, and "bargained results" where man 
agement agrees to reward productivity improvements but, because of 
the autonomy of the work groups, does not automatically obtain own 
ership of the method by which the productivity improvements were 
obtained.
The FIOM is also quick to point out the importance of how the 
group is established and its role in shaping the worker's identity.
The group planning phase is not a technical one, but is rather one 
of the processes by which workers' identity is formed in relation 
to both the company and the socio-political context. Hence the 
benefits of this reorganization of work are continuously channeled 
in two directions: towards the company and towards the workers. 
On the one hand, this approach results in the reduction of lead 
time and the improvement of product quality; on the other, it tends 
to strengthen the relationship between professional experience 
and identity.34
The importance of the group's autonomy from management is para 
mount for the FIOM. According to FIOM strategists, autonomy within
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the firm (intrafirm) could eventually be used to establish contact across 
firms (interfirm) without having to go through the normal channels of 
management hierarchy. The FIOM believes the results would be a 
more efficient and flexible system of production that acknowledges 
and rewards the efforts of members.
To date the FIOM of Emilia-Romagna has successfully signed doz 
ens of contracts which, to varying degrees, create autonomous work 
groups within the firm (see appendix).35 Still very much in the experi 
mental stage, the strategy did nevertheless receive a sympathetic hear 
ing at the FIOM's 1988 National Congress, but no formal endorsement 
was forthcoming.
The success at the intrafirm level has not yet been expanded to entail 
interfirm linkages; informally, however, on a problemsolving basis, 
work groups have begun to communicate across firms. At the Ferrari 
factory in Maranello, a suburb of Modena, the installation of a sophis 
ticated flexible machining system(FMS) to machine engine blocks pre 
sented a complex set of problems that needed to be resolved quickly to 
bring the system on-line.
The FMS, a complex series of computer-integrated machining cen 
ters, is made by Mandelli in nearby Piacenza. Communication through 
the respective Ferrari and Mandelli management hierarchies proved to 
be a time consuming, inefficient way to debug the FMS. Therefore, the 
work group installing the system found it necessary to circumvent 
management hierarchies and establish direct contact with the Mandelli 
team that built the FMS. In this case, a telephone link from one shop 
floor to the other proved more effective than the established corporate 
channels of communication. 36
Although the contracts signed so far have involved mostly medium- 
sized firms, the metalworkers have not neglected the artisan firm sec 
tor, signing their first contract (involving all three metalworkers 
unions) with the National Confederation of Artisans (CNA) in 1984. 
Efforts to expand this precedent to other sectors have been slow to 
show results. A modest breakthrough occurred in 1989 when the textile 
workers unions signed a contract with the Emilia-Romagna CNA and 
continued to pressure the other small-firm associations.
At the national level, recent legislation extended employee protec 
tion from arbitrary dismissal to include the artisan firms, further incor 
porating the small-firm sector into the national industrial relations
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system. Still, much remains to be done within both the Italian and 
overall European contexts to bring small firms into a more regulated 
system.
The innovative bargaining approach developed by the FIOM of 
Emilia-Romagna, and the results achieved, argue well for the possibil 
ity of a more democratic alternative to hierarchical, rigid production 
systems. However, the limited role of organized labor in many of the 
economic development agencies in Emilia-Romagna may prove to be 
an impediment to continued successful economic restructuring.
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Appendix to Chapter 2 












Areas of Activity and Composition
Analysis (125) Design (1235) Production (25) 
Bargaining (1235) Supervision (12)
Education (1238) Analysis (12358) Design (1235) 
Production (123568)
Analysis (238) Design (1238)
Education (128) Analysis (238) Design (1238)
Analysis (235) Design (235)
Education (2358) Analysis (1234568) Design (1234568) 
Bargaining (236) Supervision (12)
Education (23) Analysis (12345) Design (2345)
Education (238) Analysis (1234568) Design (23568)
Education (23) Analysis (12358) Design (1235) 
Production (123568)
Education (12) Analysis (735) Design (1235)
Participants
1 - Department workers
2 - Worker's Council delegates
3 - Education Department of the metalworkers union
4 - Bargaining Department of the metalworkers union
5 - Organizational Department of the metalworkers union
6 - Metalworkers union secretary
7 - Representative from Bologna Camera di Lavoro
8 - Consultant
Adopted from: O. Marchisio, "La progettazione organizzativa fra negoziazione ed identitd: i 
casi della regione Emilia-Romagna," in M. La Rosa, ed., // modello giapponese (Milan: Franco 
Angeli, 1988).
